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of the principal leaders, instigators, and planners of the war. They left the controversial
“crimes against peace” to the IMTFE and focused on war crimes violating the Geneva
Conventions. The concerns and claims of surviving victims were addressed only recently.
In spite of the formal apologies delivered by Japanese leaders, the chasm between the
views on Japan’s war and atrocities of the Japanese public and scholars, on the one hand,
and those of the Western and other Asian countries, on the other hand, remains wide.
Yves Beigbeder
Cross-references: Comfort Women; International Military Tribunal for the Far East;
Japan.
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Commission for Investigation of the Events in and Around
Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995 / Komisija za istrazˇivanje
dogad¯aja u oko Srebrenice izmed¯u 10. i 19. srpnja 1995
(Bosnia-Herzegovina)
In July 1995, during the final stages of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN-protected
“safe area” of Srebrenica that had been besieged since 1992was captured by Bosnian Serb
forces under the command of General Ratko Mladic´. Over six days, the city was attacked
and its inhabitants slaughtered. An estimated 20,000 city residents tried to flee through
the mountain forests to the Bosnian government-controlled city of Tuzla, but thousands
were killed on what has become known as the “road of death.” The remaining inhabitants
of Srebrenica sought refuge at the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) base
at Potocˇari. Mladic´’s troops arrived there on July 12, and while the Dutch troops looked
on, Bosnian Serb fighters separated the men from the women and children. The men
were taken to other locations to be summarily executed and buried in mass graves, while
the women and children were driven to the front line to be released to the Bosnian
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government. Because of the international presence in Srebrenica, the atrocity rapidly
came to global attention. The Bosnian Serbs immediately sought to deny the slaughter of
thousands of civilians. Eventually, however, the Bosnian Serb authorities were ordered
to investigate what had happened. The Commission for Investigation of the Events in
and around Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995 was created by the government of
the Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 2003 and functioned
until October 2004. It was mandated to investigate the crimes at Srebrenica in order to
“establish the full truth.”
Political Background
In the years following the atrocities, and despite the evidence being uncovered at the
InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), theRepublika Srpska
authorities strongly denied that Bosnian Serb forces had murdered thousands of civilians
in Srebrenica. They maintained this denial despite the events in The Hague, where
Drazˇen Erdemovic´, an ethnic Bosniac Croat who participated in the slaughter as a
soldier in the Republika Srpska Army, confessed that he had been involved in the mass
murder, and General Radislav Krstic´, Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps of the
same Army, was convicted of genocide in August 2001.
The Bosnian Serb authorities articulated their position most vociferously in a report
by the Bureau of the Government of Republika Srpska for Relations with the ICTY
published in September 2002. In a chapter entitled “The Alleged Massacre,” the report
seeks to challenge official estimates of the number of deaths in Srebrenica. It uses various
methods including arguing that most of the men who had fled Srebrenica were armed
and died in combat. It further argues that in the chaos of war, many of the names of the
disappeared may have appeared on several of the different lists compiled by international
agencies or civil society groups and hence records of disappearances may have been
duplicated when these were combined. The report further argued that some individuals
believed to have disappeared may have fled into exile. The report concludes that fewer
than 100 Muslims had been killed “by Bosnian Serb forces for personal revenge or in
simple ignorance of international law” (Bureau of the Government of Republika Srpska
for Relations with the ICTY 2002, 34). The report further tried to discredit Erdemovic´’s
testimony by stating that he was “mentally sick.” Other contemporary Serbian accounts,
including defense testimony at The Hague, alleged that the Muslims had either been
killed in combat, fought among themselves, committed mass suicide, or been murdered
by French, Bosnian, and other mercenaries in order to discredit the Serbs (Vuillarmy
2005, p. 3).
In March 2003, the Human Rights Chamber in Sarajevo, which had been created
under the Dayton Peace Agreement, considered forty-nine applications submitted by
relatives of persons who disappeared during the massacres in Srebrenica (a further 1,800
applications were pending at the time of the decision). In its judgment in the Ferida
Selimovic´ et al v. the Republika Srpska case, the Chamber considered the obligations
of the Republika Srpska under the European Convention on Human Rights and other
international treaties to provide victims’ families with remedies, including information
about the fate of their relatives. Unsurprisingly, the Chamber found that the 2002 Repub-
lika Srpska report on Srebrenica had failed to achieve this, and it argued instead that the
report “presents an exclusively one-sided view of the Srebrenica events, and it in no way
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clarifies the fate and whereabouts of the thousands of missing Bosniaks from Srebrenica”
(Ferida Selimovic´ et al v. the Republika Srpska, para. 179). The Human Rights Cham-
ber concluded that Republika Srpska’s failure to disclose information requested by the
relatives violated the entity government’s obligations “to secure respect for their rights to
private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention” (Ferida
Selimovic´ et al v. the Republika Srpska, para. 202). The Chamber further found that the
authorities’ failure to “inform the applicants about the truth of the fate and whereabouts
of their missing loved ones, including conducting a meaningful and effective investiga-
tion into the massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995, violates their rights to be free from
inhuman and degrading treatment, as guaranteed by Article 3 of the European Conven-
tion” (Ferida Selimovic´ et al v. the Republika Srpska, para. 202). Finally, the Chamber
held that the Republika Srpska authorities had discriminated against the victims’ fami-
lies because of their “Bosniak origin.” The chamber then ordered the Republika Srpska
authorities to release all available information to the victims’ families and the relevant
international organizations. In addition, the Chamber ordered the Bosnian Serb govern-
ment to conduct, within six months of the decision, a full, meaningful, thorough, and
detailed investigation into the events giving rise to the established human rights viola-
tions, with a view to making known to the applicants, all other family members, and the
public the Republika Srpska’s role in the facts surrounding the massacre at Srebrenica in
July 1995, its subsequent efforts to cover up those facts, and the fate and whereabouts of
the persons missing from Srebrenica. The court maintained that the investigation should
also be conducted with a view to bringing the perpetrators of any crimes committed in
connection with the missing persons from Srebrenica to justice before the competent
domestic criminal courts or to extraditing persons wanted by the ICTY for prosecution
for war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity in connection with the Srebrenica
events. This investigation should include, among other necessary measures, an internal
investigation of present and former members of the Republika Srpska Army who may
have relevant personal knowledge of the Srebrenica events or the location of any personal
effects or burial sites of persons killed in connection with the Srebrenica events. The
chamber also ordered the Republika Srpska government to contribute financially to the
Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potocˇari Memorial and Cemetery.
On October 15, 2003, the ruling of the Human Rights Chamber was endorsed by the
thenHighRepresentative Paddy Ashdown. TheOffice of theHighRepresentative (OHR)
was created by the Dayton Peace Accords and was tasked with overseeing the implemen-
tation of their civilian aspects. Within this role, Ashdown ordered the Republika Srpska
entity to create an investigative commission.
Mission, Organization, and Activity
On December 15, 2003, the government of Republika Srpska responded to the pressure
and created the Commission for Investigation of the Events in and around Srebrenica
between 10 and 19 July 1995. The main task of the commission was “the investigation
and other activities in order to establish the full truth of the events in and around
Srebrenica between 10th and 19th July 1995, aiming to establish lasting peace and build
confidence in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (The Events in and around Srebrenica between
10 and 19 July 1995 2004, 3). The Commission interpreted its mandate to require it
“to investigate the stated crimes; the scale of the crimes; who ordered them; and who
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committed them” (The Events in and around Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995
2004, 4). It also sought to gather information on “the invasion of Srebrenica; the attempt
to evacuate the population; the humanitarian crisis; the situation in Potocˇari; the situation
in the mixed column [of combatants and refugees through the mountain forests towards
Tuzla]; the fate and the location of the missing persons; information on new locations
of individual and mass graves; [and] identification of the victims” (The Events in and
around Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995 2004, 4–5). In particular, the commission
sought to create an accurate list of the victims. The decision creating the commission
instructed “the Republika Srpska Ministries of Justice, Internal Affairs and Defense, the
security services, the Republika Srpska Army Command, and the entity Secretariat for
relations with the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague” to cooperate fully
with the commission (The Events in and around Srebrenica between 10 and 19 July 1995
2004, 3). The commission was given six months to complete its work and submit the
final report.
On December 25, 2003, the Republika Srpska government nominated Marko Arsovic´
as the commission’s chair and appointed six other commissioners: Milan Bogdanic´,
Milorad Ivosˇevic´, Ðord¯e Stojakovic´, Gojko Vukotic´, Smail Cˇekic´, and Gordon Bacon.
The OHR had nominated Smail Cˇekic´ to represent victims’ families and Gordon Bacon
to represent the international community. The OHR and the ICTY were given observer
status. The commission held its first meeting on January 12, 2004, in which it adopted a
work plan and appointed Ðord¯e Stojakovic´ and Smail Cˇekic´ as vice-chairpersons.
After agreeing on a methodology, the commission began its investigations in February
2004 and focused on gathering information from Republika Srpska authorities and indi-
viduals who had been involved. The commission also contacted relevant international
institutions and agencies and victims’ associations. However, it initially faced obstruction
from the Republika Srpska authorities, and the commission’s interim report, produced
on April 14, 2004, was condemned as merely repeating “the worst of the denials” (Vul-
liamy 2005). This continued obstruction enraged High Representative Ashdown, and he
proclaimed that the report was “a scandalous indictment of the Republika Srpska institu-
tions which were legally andmorally bound to cooperate fully with the Commission, and
yet according to this report have failed to” (Freeman 2004, 9). He then responded to the
obstruction by using his wide-ranging “Bonn powers,” which allowed him to make bind-
ing decisions against persons who he found to be violating the peace agreement, to order
the removal from office of Republika Srpska ArmyChief of Staff Cvjetko Savic´, andHead
of the Republika Srpska Government Secretariat for Cooperation with the ICTY Dejan
Miletic´. Ashdown also ordered the president of the Republika Srpska to remove the chair
of the commission, Marko Arsovic´, and replace him as chair with another commission
member,Milan Bogdanic´. The Republika Srpska government complied and it appointed
Zˇeljko Vujadinovic´ to the vacancy in the commission. Furthermore, in response to the
OHR requests and the short time frame for investigations, the commission then focused
its work on locating mass graves and producing a list of those who were killed.
Following these changes, in June 2004, the commission produced a Final Report that
acknowledged that “between 10 and 19 July 1995, several thousands of Bosniaks were
liquidated, in a manner that represents severe violation of International Humanitarian
Law and that the perpetrators, among the others, undertook measures to cover up the
crime by reallocating the bodies” (The Events in and around Srebrenica between 10 and
19 July 1995 2004, 41). This was the first official acknowledgment by the Bosnian Serbs of
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their culpability for the crimes in Srebrenica. The report was greeted by the Bosnian Serb
president Dragan Cˇavicˇ in a television statement in which he said that the “nine July days
of the Srebrenica tragedy are a black page in the history of the Serb people” (Milanovic
2006, 255). In October 2004, the commission released an addendum to the report
in which it analyzed various lists gathered by international organizations and victims’
groups of persons believed to have disappeared at Srebrenica. The report concluded
that 7,779 persons were killed, but it stressed that investigations needed to continue.
The commission’s investigations also revealed previously unknown information about
Srebrenica by identifying thirty-two mass graves, reconstructing the involvement of the
wartimemilitary and police units of Republika Srpska (which underwent vetting between
1999 and 2002), and drafting lists of potential perpetrators.
Following these reports, on October 28, 2004, the government of Republika Srpska
issued an official apology in which it stated that it “commiserates with the pain of relatives
of perished people of Srebrenica, and truly regrets and apologizes for the tragedy they
experienced” (Milanovic 2006, 255). It also stated that it was committed to ensuring
that those responsible were brought to justice. In December 2004, the OHR ordered the
Republika Srpska government to establish a working group to analyze the commission’s
documentation and “identify all officials, particularly those still in RS [Republika Srpska]
bodies, whose names appeared in the confidential annexes” (Office of High Represen-
tative 2004). This Working Group, which began operating at the end of January 2005,
submitted its first report in March 2005. The annexes, which are believed to contain the
names of hundreds of suspects, have remained confidential.
Conclusion
The Commission for Investigation of the Events in and around Srebrenica between
10 and 19 July 1995 conducted its investigations within a tight time frame and in
the face of considerable political obstruction from the Republika Srpska authorities.
Nonetheless, it succeeded in bringing new information to light by locating previously
unknownmass graves. Furthermore, by identifying thousands of the victims at Srebrenica,
the commission undermined the culture of denial that had been prevalent in Bosnian
Serb discourse. The Republika Srpska government’s acknowledgment of the report and
the president’s apology represented the first official public truth revealed in the former
Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of these reports, only very few Bosnian Serb politicians
deny the events at Srebrenica, and the Republika Srpska has gradually become more
cooperative with justice initiatives, as the Bosnian Serb authorities transferred their first
indictee to The Hague on January 16, 2005.
Louise Mallinder
Cross-references: Bosnia-Herzegovina; International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
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Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation / Comissa˜o
de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliac¸a˜o de Timor Leste (East
Timor)
The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (known by its Portuguese
acronym, CAVR) was established in July 2001 to deal with the human rights violations
and suffering experienced by the East Timorese during the period between the departure
of the Portuguese colonial power in April 1974 and the United Nations’ arrival to stop
the post-independence referendum violence in October 1999. Most of the killings and
other violations investigated by the Commission were perpetrated by the Indonesian
military during their invasion and occupation of East Timor, and by the pro-integration,
Indonesian-led Timorese militia in 1999. The Commission also covered the violations
perpetrated by Timorese political factions during the civil war of 1974–1975 and the
brief period of independence before Indonesia invaded inDecember 1975.Human rights
violations identified and documented by the Commission included unlawful killings and
enforced disappearances; forced displacement and famine; detention, torture, and ill-
treatment; violations of the laws ofwar; sexual violence; violations of the rights of the child;
and violations of economic and social rights. In addition to producing a historical record
of the human rights abuses (truth), the Commission was also responsible for facilitating
the reception and reintegration of East Timorese refugees and those who committed
lesser crimes (reconciliation). The Commission was wound up after completion of
its final report, Chega! (“Enough!” in Portuguese), in October 2005. The Post-CAVR
Technical Secretariat was established in December 2005.
Political Background
On August 30, 1999, 78.5 percent of the East Timorese population voted against
autonomy within Indonesia, thereby embracing independence, which was subsequently
declared on May 20, 2002. The international community has supported peace-building
in East Timor, including attention to both justice and reconciliation strategies to promote
healing and rebuilding of relationships within communities divided by violence, as well
